



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-0001

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CIA/Congressional Liaison

ATTN: [REDACTED]

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Attached are 2 papers  
prepared by DIA and provided  
to both JCS + OSD for CJCS +  
SECDEF use in Congressional INF  
Hearings. Handwritten paper  
was prepared by [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] DIA/ED. Other paper  
was actually prepared by OSD  
based on input from [REDACTED]

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# Testimony guidelines re Verification

## I. OPEN HEARINGS

a. Acknowledge difficult challenge

b. That is why U.S. government making special effort

(1) insisted on OSI

(2) insisted on other cooperative measures

(3) Sponsoring advanced new collection systems

(4) Establishing a dedicated staff of experts to constantly work the problem, under D.C.I.

c. On balance, have high confidence in the verification process.

NOTE: It is important for Soviet consumption that US senior officials, especially in Defense, stick to this bottom line

d. Regarding questions about cheating scenarios and discrepancies in Soviet data exchange - acknowledged there are concerns, but need to address in close

hearing. (Amplification per submission given to Amb Woodward per Sec Def request) - ATTACHE

## II. CLOSED HEARINGS

- a. Generally same theme as recommended for open hearings -
- b. Soviet data discrepancies, i.e. DIA position on SS-20:
  - (1) The position has possibility, thus major concern
  - (2) If Soviet attempt to keep them at a ready state, then fairly high detectability
  - (3) If Soviet keep them in dormant state, then lose reliability (thus military value) over time
  - (4) Will be objective of intelligence operation - High priority
- c. Many possible cheating scenarios (10 in NFE)
  - (1) Most cheating scenarios in NFE, while of concern have flaws in terms of military credibility
    - (a) no flight tests undermines most
    - (b) assume Soviet change doctrine that is unlikely
    - (c) Time works against cheater, for US intelligence
  - (2) Of most concern, is above scenario (b above), however points in (c) above also apply
- d. Will maintain military sufficiency even under (b) above cheating scenarios
- e. If Soviet attempt more robust, more military significant, have confidence US intelligence will come through.

Question: Shouldn't the intelligence community revise the estimates of Soviet INF missiles to comply with the actual numbers contained in the MOU? What is the Administration doing about discrepancies?

Answer: - Soviet data provided in the MOU is generally consistent with our intelligence estimates.

- However, we were deeply concerned with Soviet delay in exchanging all the required categories of data during the concluding phase of the negotiations. This brought Soviet forthrightness into question.

- The full set of data we ultimately received was judged to be adequate to permit us to accept the Memorandum of Understanding. I should underscore, however, that this step did not constitute U.S. agreement with the Soviet data contained therein. *Good*

- We are continuing to monitor Soviet INF forces closely, as in the past, and will continue to analyze Soviet data against our own intelligence estimates. This will be particularly important where potential U.S. concern remains on the accuracy of Soviet data on non-deployed SS-20 missiles, which fall substantially short of the upper range of U.S. estimates.

(If pressed on whether a compliance issue exists on SS-20 numbers):

- Soviet SS-20 numbers fall above the lower range of estimates in the U.S. intelligence community but below the upper range. Thus, we are dealing here with estimates which, as such, do not provide the basis for specific claims regarding Soviet compliance.

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SUBJECT CONGRESSIONAL INF HEARINGS

CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS PAGES 5

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REMARKS:

**Classification/Handling Caveats**

DIA Form 701-3 (8-85)